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Abstract. This paper presents a formal verication with the Coq proof
assistant of a memory model for C -like imperative languages. This model
denes the memory layout and the operations that manage the mem-
ory. The model has been specied at two levels of abstraction and im-
plemented as part of an ongoing certication in Coq of a moderately-
optimising C compiler. Many properties of the memory have been ver-
ied in the specication. They facilitate the denition of precise formal
semantics of C pointers. A certied OCaml code implementing the mem-
ory model has been automatically extracted from the specications.
1 Introduction
Formal verication of computer programs  be it by model checking, program
proof, static analysis, or any other means  obviously requires that the semantics
of the programming language in which the program is written be formalized in
a way that is exploitable by the verication tools used. In the case of program
proofs, these formal semantics are often presented as operational semantics or
specialized logics such as Hoare logic. The need for formal semantics is even
higher when the program being veried itself operates over programs: compilers,
program analyzers, etc. In the case of a compiler, for instance, no less than
three formal semantics are required: one for the implementation language of the
compiler, one for the source language, and one for the target language. More
generally speaking, formal semantics on machine (that is, presented in a form
that can be exploited by verication tools) are an important aspect of formal
methods.
Formal semantics are relatively straightforward in the case of declarative pro-
gramming languages such as pure functional or logic languages. Many programs
that require formal verication are written in imperative languages, however.
These languages feature assignments to variables and in-place modication of
data structures. Giving semantics to these imperative constructs requires the
development of an adequate memory model, that is, a formal description of the
memory layout and the operations over it. The memory model is often one of the
most delicate parts of a formal semantics for an imperative programming lan-
guage: an excessively concrete memory model (e.g. representing the memory as a
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single array of bytes) can fail to validate algebraic laws over loads and stores that
are actually valid in the programming language and thus make program proofs
more dicult; an excessively abstract memory model can fail to account for e.g.
aliasing or partial overlap between memory areas, thus causing the semantics to
be incorrect.
This paper reports on the design, formalization and verication, using the
Coq proof assistant, of a memory model for C -like imperative languages. In
addition to being widely used for programming safety-critical software, C and
related languages are challenging from the standpoint of the memory model,
because they feature both pointers and pointer arithmetic, on the one hand, and
isolation and freshness guarantees on the other. For instance, pointer arithmetic
can result in aliasing or partial overlap between the memory areas referenced by
two pointers; yet, it is guaranteed that the memory areas corresponding to two
distinct variables or two successive calls to malloc are disjoint. This stands in
contrast with both higher-level imperative languages such as Java, where two
distinct references always refer to disjoint data, and lower-level languages such
as machine code, where unrestricted address arithmetic invalidates all isolation
guarantees.
The memory model presented here is used in the formal verication of a
moderately-optimising compiler that translates a large subset of the C pro-
gramming language down to PowerPC assembly code [13]. The memory model
is used by the formal semantics of all languages manipulated by the compiler:
the source language (large subset of C ), the target language (subset of PowerPC
assembly), and 5 intermediate languages that bridge the semantic gap between
source and target. Certain passes of the compiler perform non-trivial transfor-
mations on memory allocations and accesses: for instance, the auto variables of
a C function, initially mapped to individually-allocated memory blocks, are at
some point mapped to sub-blocks of a single stack-allocated activation record,
which at a later point is extended to make room for storing spilled temporaries.
Proving the correctness (semantic preservation) of these transformations require
extensive reasoning over the memory model, using the properties of this model
given further in the paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents how
we have formally veried a compiler with the Coq proof assistant. Section 3
describes the formal verication of our memory model. Section 4 explains how
OCaml code has been automatically generated from this verication. Section 5
discusses related work. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Certication of a C -like Compiler
The formal verication of a compiler is the formal proof of the following equiva-
lence result: any source program that terminates on some nal memory state is
compiled into a program that also terminates and produces the same memory
state. Usually, such an equivalence result relies on a more general notion of equiv-
alence between memory states. But, our memory model aims at facilitating this
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correctness proof and it is designed in such a way that the memory states are the
same at the end of the execution of source and compiled programs. The correct-
ness result is not proved directly but in several steps. Each step corresponds to a
transformation (that is, either a translation or an optimisation) achieved by the
compiler. Each correctness proof of a transformation proceeds by induction on
the execution of the original program using a simulation lemma: if the original
program executes one statement, the transformed program executes zero, one or
several statements.
Our compiler treats a large subset of C. It compiles any C program in which
jump statements (i.e. goto, setjmp and longjmp) are not allowed, and functions
have a xed number of arguments. The expression evaluation order is dened
in the compiler: expressions are evaluated from left to right, thus leaving less
freedom to the compiler. Furthermore, as dynamic allocation of variables is done
explicitly in C by calling the library functions malloc and free, the semantics
of these functions is not dened in our formal semantics and there is no garbage
collector in the compiler. The proof that these functions ensure lack of dangling
pointers is thus out of the scope of this paper.
The formal verication of the memory model belongs to an ongoing formal
verication with the Coq proof assistant of this compiler, and it consists of:
 a formal specication at several levels of abstraction a memory model,
 a formal proof about many properties of this memory model,
 the automatic generation from the specication of a certied code that ver-
ies the same properties as the formal specication.
The Coq proof assistant [1, 4] consists mainly of a language called Gallina for
writing formal specications and a language for developing mathematical proofs
to verify some properties on the formal specications. Gallina relies on the Cal-
culus of Inductive Constructions, a higher-order typed λ−calculus with depen-
dent types and capabilities for inductive denitions. Proving a simple property
consists in writing interactively proof commands that are called tactics. Tactics
may also consist of user-dened tactics, thus making it possible to decompose a
property into simpler reasoning steps and to reuse proof scripts.
Coq provides a way to structure specications in large units called modules.
The Coq module system [7] reuses the main features of the OCaml module sys-
tem. A module is a collection of denitions of types, values and modules. It
consists of two parts: a signature and an implementation. The signature of a
module is an abstract specication of the components that must occur in all
possible implementations of that module. The type of a module is its signature.
Modules can be parametrised by modules. Parametrised modules are called func-
tors (i.e. functions from modules to modules). One way to build modules is to
apply a functor. The other way is to build it denition by denition. A module
may be associated with a signature to verify that the denitions of the mod-
ule are compatible with the signature. Properties may be dened in modules.
When a property is dened in the signature of a module, it must be proved in
any implementation of this module. The property is thus called an axiom (resp.
theorem) in the signature (resp. implementation) of the module.
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Coq provides also an automated mechanism for extracting functional pro-
grams from specications [14]. The extraction from a Coq function or proof
removes all logical statements (i.e. predicates) and translates the remaining con-
tent to a program written in OCaml. As the extracted program veries the same
properties as the Coq specication, the extracted code is called the certied code.
The Coq extraction mechanism handles the module system: Coq modules are ex-
tracted to OCaml modules, Coq signatures are extracted to OCaml signatures,
and Coq functors are extracted to OCaml functors.
3 Formal Specication
This section describes the formal verication in Coq of our memory model. It
species the memory layout and the operations that manage the memory. This
formal specication is written at two levels of abstraction:
 The abstract specication is suitable for most of imperative languages. It
denes a general memory model, parametrised by some characteristics of
the language it applies to (e.g. the values of the language), and properties
that need to be veried by a more concrete specication.
 The concrete specication is devoted to C -like languages with pointer arith-
metic. It implements the operations dened in the abstract specication,
and proves that they satisfy the abstract specication. The properties that
have been stated in the abstract specication are proved in the concrete
specication. Other properties are also stated (and proved) in the concrete
specication.
This section presents two concrete specications. The rst one is devoted to an
innite memory model of a C compiler. The second one denes a nite memory
model that corresponds to the rst concrete specication. In this paper, we
will use familiar mathematical notation to present our development in Coq. For
instance, inductive denitions will be presented in BNF format and Coq arrows
will be replaced by either conjunctions or implications.
3.1 Abstract Specication
The abstract specication denes the memory layout in terms of records and
maps. Several types are left unspecied. The operations that manage the memory
are only dened by their types. Some axioms are also dened in the abstract
specication.
Memory Layout Figure 1 describes the types that specify the memory layout.
The memory is separated into four areas that do not overlap:
 the free memory called memfree that can be allocated during the execution
of a program,
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 the null memory called memnull that is not accessible during the execution
of a program,
 the memory called memdata that stores data,
 the memory called memcode that stores code, i.e. the procedures of a pro-
gram. 1
The type of memory is called Tmem. It is a record whose four elds repre-
sent the four areas. Each area is represented by a map (that is, a partial nite
function) of type Tmemi from blocks identiers Tblock to blocks Tblock i, where
i denotes a memory area. Tblock is an ordered type and ≤ denotes an order
relation on Tblock. A block consists of a low bound, a high bound and a map
from osets Tofs (i.e. cells identiers) to memory cells Tcell i. Tcell i is equipped
with a comparison relation that we write =. The high and low bounds of a block
are block identiers. The contents of the cells in a block depend on the area the
block belongs to. Usually, each cell of the data area stores a value on a given
number of bytes. Each cell of the code area stores a procedure (i.e. a C func-
tion). Each cell of the null area stores either a deallocated cell or a null cell that
has never been deallocated.
The types that are left unspecied in the abstract specication are related to
the way blocks and cells are addressed (cf. Tblock and Tofs) and to the contents
of memory cells (cf. Tcelli , ∀i ∈ {data, free, null} and Tprocedure). The four
areas of the memory are handled in a similar way. For space reasons, this paper
focuses on the memory area that stores data.
Memory layout:
Tmem ::= {memdata := Tmemdata
;memfree := Tmemfree
;memnull := Tmemnull
;memcode := Tmemcode }
Memory areas:
∀i ∈ {data, free, null, code}, Tmemi ::= Map (Tblock ,Tblock i)
Memory blocks:
∀i ∈ {data, free, null}, Tblock i ::= {high := Tblock
; low := Tblock
; contents := Map (Tofs,Tcelli) }
Tblockcode ::= Tprocedure
Fig. 1. Abstract specication of the memory layout: type denitions.
1 In the sequel of this paper, we use the word procedure to denote a C function. The
word function is reserved to Coq mathematical functions that are dened in the
specication.
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Figure 2 denes some relations between blocks and memory and some of their
properties. The relation called valid data block states that a block b is valid with
respect to a memory m if it has been allocated in the area of m that stores data
(i.e. it belongs to the domain of the mapm.memdata.). This relation is often used
as a precondition in the operations that manage the memory (see for instance
the denition of load in gure 5). The axiom called valid not valid di states
that any block is either valid or not.
The relation called block agree is an agreement relation between blocks. Two
blocks belonging to two memories agree between two bounds called lo and hi if
they share a same identier b and if each of their cells that is between the bounds
lo and hi, stores the same value. This relation is an equivalence relation: it veries
the three axioms called block agree re, block agree sym and block agree trans.
The relation called extends states that a memory m2 extends another mem-
ory m1 if each valid block b of m1 is also a block of m2. More precisely, if b
identies a valid block (m1.memdata)(b) of m1, then it identies also a bigger
block (m2.memdata)(b) of m2 (i.e. a block such that its cells are included in
the cells of (m2.memdata)(b)) and both blocks agree between the bounds of the
smallest block m1(b). The picture of gure 2 shows an example of two such
blocks. The compilation process relies on a run-time stack of memory blocks
called stack frames. At the beginning of the compilation process of a program,
a stack frame is allocated for each instance of a called procedure. Information
that are computed in further steps of the compilation process are stored in stack
frames and reused in further steps of the process. The relation called extends is
useful to specify the extension of stack frames during the compilation process.
Memory Management The main operations that manage the memory are
alloc, free, load and store. They are specied in the gure 3, where alloc, load and
store are related to the memory area that stores data. Similar operations related
to the memory area that stores code have also been specied. Each operation
that manage the memory may fail (e.g. alloc may fail if there are no free cells
left). Thus, its results is of type option(τ). The values of such a type are either
None (when the operation fails) or Some(v) where v is of type τ .
load and store operations are parametrised by memory chunks. A memory
chunk indicates the size and the type of accessed data. Its type is called Tchunk
and is left unspecied in the abstract specication. Memory chunks ensure that
each load operation follows a store operation that supplied the value retrieved
by the load. For instance, when an operation such as (store chunk1 m1 b ofs1
= Some m2 ) is followed by an operation such as (load chunk2 m b ofs2 ) then
the load does not fail only if chunk1, chunk2, ofs1 and ofs2 are compatible.
The functionalities of the memory management operations are the following:
 alloc is the function that allocates a block with given bounds. If it does not
fail, this function yields a newly allocated block and the modied memory.
 free is the function that deallocates a given block of data.
 load is the function that given a memory chunk fetches the value stored in a
given block of data.
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Denition valid data block (m: Tmem) (b: Tblock) := b ∈ domain(m.memdata).
Axiom valid not valid di:
∀ (m: Tmem) (b b' : Tblock),
valid data block m b ∧ ¬(valid data block m b' ) ⇒ b 6= b'.
Denition block agree (b: Tblock) (lo hi : Tblock) (m1 m2 : Tmem) :=
∀ ofs ∈ [lo,hi ],
((m1.memdata)(b).contents)(ofs) = ((m2.memdata)(b).contents)(ofs).
Axiom block agree re:
∀ (m: Tmem) (b: Tblock) (lo hi : Tblock),
block agree b lo hi m m.
Axiom block agree sym:
∀ (m1 m2 : Tmem) (b: Tblock) (lo hi : Tblock),
block agree b lo hi m1 m2 ⇒
block agree b lo hi m2 m1.
Axiom block agree trans:
∀ (m1 m2 m3 : Tmem) (b: Tblock) (lo hi : Tblock),
block agree b lo hi m1 m2 ∧ block agree b lo hi m2 m3 ⇒
block agree b lo hi m1 m3.
Denition extends (m1 m2 : Tmem) :=
∀ (b: Tblock),
valid data block m1 b ⇒
(m2.memdata)(b).low ≤ (m1.memdata)(b).low ∧
(m1.memdata)(b).high ≤ (m2.memdata)(b).high ∧
block agree b (m1.memdata)(b).low (m1.memdata)(b).high m1 m2
(m2.memdata) (b)
(m1.memdata) (b)
(m2.memdata) (b).high(m2.memdata) (b).low
(m1.memdata) (b).high
(m1.memdata) (b).low
Fig. 2. Abstract specication of the memory layout: properties.
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 store is the function that given a memory chunk stores a value in a given
block of data. The load (resp. store) function fails if the value to load (resp.
store) is not compatible with the memory chunk and the oset (e.g. if the
memory chunk is to large). As these functions are left unspecied at the
abstract level, this property consists of axioms such as loaded block is valid
and loaded block is in bounds that will be proved once the functions will be
dened.
The axiom called loaded block is in bounds uses a property called in bounds
that denes when a value may be loaded from or stored in the two bounds
of a block. in bounds is used as a precondition that triggers loads and stores
in memory. As block identiers and osets are left unspecied in the abstract
specication, in bounds is also left unspecied. It is a relation, i.e. a function
that yields values of a type called Prop. This Coq type is used to dene logical
propositions.
Other properties of the operations that manage the memory express that the
relations between blocks are preserved by the memory management operations.
For instance, the axiom called valid block store expresses that the load operation
does not invalidate valid blocks. More precisely, it states that if a value v is
stored in a memory m1.memdata, any block b that was valid before the operation
remains valid after. The axiom called store agree states that the store operation
preserves the agreement relation. The axiom load extends states that the load
operation preserves the extension relation. Figure 3 shows only some axioms of
the specication. Similar axioms have been dened for all memory management
operations.
3.2 Implementation of an Innite Memory
This section presents an implementation of our memory model that is devoted
to a C-like compiler. The implementation of values and addresses is adapted to
C pointer arithmetic and the implementation of memory chunks follows the C
arithmetic types. In this implementation, the memory is unlimited and thus the
allocation never fails. New properties of the memory management are added in
this implementation.
For each language manipulated by our compiler, we have encoded in Coq
operational semantics rules that detail how the memory is accessed and modied
during the execution of a program. For instance, the evaluation of a procedure
respects the following judgements of the source and target languages of the
compiler (called respectively C and PPC ):
Gc ⊢ pc, lv, m ⇒ v, m
′ states that in the global environment Gc and the memory
m, the evaluation in C of the procedure pc called with the list of values lv of
its arguments computes a value v. The memory at the end of the evaluation
in C is m′.
Gppc ⊢ r,m 99K r
′,m′ states that in the global environment Gppc, the evaluation
in PPC of the current function updates the set of registers r into r′ and the
memory m into m′.
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Memory management operations:
alloc : Tmem → Tblock → Tblock → option (Tmem ∗ Tblock)
free : Tmem → Tblock → option (Tmem)
load : Tchunk → Tmem → Tblock → Tofs → option (Tvalue)
store : Tchunk → Tmem → Tblock → Tofs → Tvalue → option (Tmem)
Relation between blocks and memory chunks:
in bounds : Tchunk → Tofs → Tblock → Tblock → Prop
Some properties of memory management operations:
Axiom loaded block is valid:
∀ (chunk : Tchunk) (m: Tmem) (b: Tblock) (ofs: Tofs) (v :Tvalue),
load chunk m b ofs = Some v ⇒
valid data block m b.
Axiom loaded block is in bounds:
∀ (chunk : Tchunk) (m: Tmem) (b: Tblock) (ofs: Tofs) (v : Tvalue),
load chunk m b ofs = Some v ⇒
in bounds chunk ofs (m.memdata)(b).low (m.memdata)(b).high.
Axiom valid block store:
∀ (chunk : Tchunk) (m1 m2 : Tmem) (b b' : Tblock) (ofs: Tofs) (v : Tvalue),
store chunk m1 b' ofs v = Some m2 ∧
valid data block m1 b ⇒
valid data block m2 b.
Axiom store agree:
∀ (chunk : Tchunk) (m1 m2 m1' m2' : Tmem) (b b' : Tblock)
(lo hi : Tblock) (ofs: Tofs) (v : Tvalue),
block agree b lo hi m1 m2 ∧
store chunk m1 b' ofs v = Some m1' ∧
store chunk m2 b' ofs v = Some m2' ⇒
block agree b lo hi m1' m2'.
Axiom load extends:
∀ (chunk : Tchunk) (m1 m2 : Tmem) (b: Tblock) (ofs: Tofs) (v : Tvalue),
extends m1 m2 ∧
load chunk m1 b ofs = Some v ⇒
load chunk m2 b ofs = Some v.
Fig. 3. Abstract specication of the memory management.
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These semantics rely on the memory management operations. For instance,
in the dynamic semantics of PPC, references to variables correspond to explicit
loads and stores. There are 13 load instructions and 10 store instructions in
PPC. In the dynamic semantics of C:
 A block of memory is allocated for each declared variable. The cells of the
block that stores an array consist of the elements of the array.
 Such a block is deallocated at the end of the scope of the variable.
 The evaluation of a left value loads a value from memory.
 The execution of any assignment statement is based on the load and store
operations.
Memory Layout Figure 4 denes the types that were left unspecied in the ab-
stract specication in gure 1. The blocks and the osets of a block are identied
by integers. The sizes of stored values are one, two, four and eight bytes. Values
are either undened values, or integers or oats or non null pointer values. The
undened value Vundef is a junk value that represents the value of uninitialised
variables. A value of type pointer is either the integer 0 (that represents the
NULL pointer) or a pair of a block identier (that is, the address of the rst cell
of the block) and an oset between the block and the cell the pointer points to.
This representation of pointers is adapted to C pointer arithmetic. For instance,
the expression (Vptr b ofs) + (Vint i) evaluates to the pointer value (Vptr
b Vint (ofs + i)) if this evaluation does not fail. In other words, the only
integers i that can be added to a pointer value are those such that (ofs + i)
is in the bounds of the block b. Another example is the comparison between
pointers: two pointers that are not NULL may be compared only if they point to
a same block.
Addresses:
Tblock ::= Z
Tofs ::= Z
Values:
Tcelldata ::= Tsize ∗ Tvalue a data cell is a pair of a size and a value
Tsize ::= {1, 2, 4, 8} number of bytes of a cell
Tvalue ::= Vint Tinteger integer
| Vfloat Toat oat
| Vptr Tblock Tofs pointer (a block and an oset)
| Vundef undened value
Fig. 4. An implementation of the memory layout.
Usually, properties of memory layouts are classied into separation, adjacency
and containment properties [26]. This is also the kind of properties of our memory
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model. Separation and adjacency of memory blocks are valid in our model by
construction. By construction, each memory block belongs to only one memory
area. Two dierent blocks are also separated by construction since a cell of a
block can not be accessed from another block. The containment property we use
is the extends relation.
Memory Management The memory chunks that were left unspecied in g-
ure 3 are implemented in gure 5 in the following way: integers are stored on
either one, two or four bytes, and oats are stored on either four or eight bytes.
Integers that are stored on one or two bytes are either signed or unsigned. Pointer
values are implemented by integers stored on four bytes.
The alloc and free functions never fail. The allocation method is linear. load
chunk m b ofs fails when b does not identify a block of the data area of m and
when the property in bounds chunk ofs b is not true. The load function calls
the load result function in order to load each cell that needs to be loaded in the
block b from the oset ofs. The load result function fetches a value in memory
and casts this value to a value of a type dened by a memory chunk, when the
memory chunk is compatible with the value. Memory chunks determine also if a
block needs to be lled with digits. For instance, when an integer that is stored
on one or two bytes is loaded, it is automatically extended to four bytes (by the
function called load result), either by adding zeroes if the integer is unsigned, or
by replicating the sign bit if the integer is signed (see the function cast1signed
called by load result). The load result function fails if the memory chunk is not
compatible with the value, for instance if it attempts to load a oat value when
the memory chunk corresponds to an integer. For space reasons, the denition
of this function is not fully detailed in gure 5.
Some new properties of the operations that manage the memory are dened
in the implementation. They have not been dened in the abstract specication
because they rely on the implementation of the memory management operations.
These properties express that the memory blocks remember correctly the stored
values. More precisely:
1. If an operation updates a block of a memory area by storing a value in it,
then the content of this block becomes this value,
2. and the other blocks of memory are not modied.
3. A block which is modied by an operation belongs to the memory that results
from the modication.
These properties are often called the good variable properties [25]. Our certi-
cation uses them in order to prove analogous properties on stack frames built
by the compiler. As these properties are related to memory blocks consisting of
memory cells, their proof relies on analogous properties for memory cells.
Figure 6 species some of the good variable properties. In the two theorems
called load store same and load store other, a value v is stored in a memory m1
at the oset ofs1 of a block b1, given a memory chunk called chunk. The resulting
memory is called m2. The rst theorem called load store same states that v is
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Memory chunks:
Tchunk ::= Mint1signed signed integer stored on one byte
| Mint1unsigned unsigned integer stored on one byte
| Mint2signed signed integer stored one on two bytes
| Mint2unsigned unsigned integer stored on two bytes
| Mint4 integer stored on four bytes
| Mfloat4 oat stored on four bytes
| Mfloat8 oat stored on eight bytes
Memory management operations:
Denition size chunk (chunk : Tchunk) := . . .
(* number of bytes corresponding to chunk, e.g. 4 for Mint4 *)
Denition in bounds (chunk : Tchunk) (ofs: Tofs) (lo hi : Tblock) :=
lo ≤ ofs ∧ ofs + size chunk chunk ≤ hi.
Denition load result (chunk : Tchunk) (v : Tvalue) :=
match chunk, v with
| Mint1signed, Vint n : Some (Vint (cast1signed n))
(* values are casted in order to t the memory chunks *)
| . . .
| Mint4, Vptr b ofs : Some (Vptr b ofs)
| Moat4, Voat f : Some (Voat (singleooat f ))
| . . .
| , : None
(* erroneous cases, e.g. an integer chunk such as Mint4 and a oat value *)
end.
Denition load (chunk : Tchunk) (m: Tmem) (b: Tblock) (ofs: Tofs) :
if valid data block m b ∧ in bounds chunk ofs m(b).low m(b).high
then load result chunk . . .
(* the second parameter is the value that is found in cell b at oset ofs *)
else None.
Fig. 5. An implementation of the memory management.
also the value that is loaded in m2 at the address where it has been stored. The
second theorem called load store other states that the store operation of v (in a
block b1 at the oset ofs1 ) does not change any other value of the memory, i.e.
any other value that is fetched either in another block b2 or in the same block b1
but at another valid oset ofs2. An oset is valid in a block if there are enough
remaining cells in the block in order to store a value form this oset.
Other properties are related to the high and low bounds of memory blocks.
They express the compatibility between the bounds of a block and the oset
from where a value is stored or loaded in that block. For instance, the theorem
low bound store of gure 7 states that if a value v is stored in a memory m1,
then the resulting memory m2 has the same low bound as m1. Finally, a few
other relations between the memory management operations. For instance, the
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Theorem load store same:
∀ (chunk : Tchunk) (m1 m2 : Tmem) (b1 : Tblock) (ofs1 : Tofs) (v : Tvalue),
store chunk m1 b1 ofs1 v = Some m2 ⇒
load chunk m2 b1 ofs1 = Some (load result chunk v).
Theorem load store other:
∀ (chunk1 chunk2 : Tchunk) (m1 m2 : Tmem) (b1 b2 : Tblock)
(ofs1 ofs2 : Tofs) (v : Tvalue),
store chunk1 m1 b1 ofs1 v = Some m2 ∧
(b1 6= b2 ∨ ofs2 + size chunk chunk2 ≤ ofs1 ∨ ofs1 + size chunk chunk1 ≤ ofs2 )
⇒ load chunk2 m2 b2 ofs2 = load chunk2 m1 b2 ofs2.
Fig. 6. Some good-variable properties
theorem called store alloc states that a value may be stored from a given oset
in a newly allocated block if the memory chunk and the oset are compatible
with the bounds of this block.
Theorem low bound store:
∀ (chunk : Tchunk) (m1 m2 : Tmem) (b b' : Tblock) (ofs: Tofs) (v : Tvalue),
store chunk m1 b ofs v = Some m2 ⇒
(m2.memdata)(b' ).low = (m1.memdata)(b' ).low.
Theorem store alloc:
∀ (chunk : Tchunk) (m1 m2 : Tmem) (b lo hi : Tblock) (ofs: Tofs) (v : Tvalue),
alloc m1 lo hi = Some (m2, b) ∧
in bounds chunk ofs lo hi ⇒
∃ m3 | store chunk m2 b ofs v = Some m3.
Fig. 7. Other properties of memory management operations
3.3 Implementation of a Finite Memory
The execution of a source program may exceed the memory of the target ma-
chine. Thus, we have implemented another memory model where the size of
memory cells and the number of blocks in each memory area are nite. The
only dierence with the previous model relies in the implementation of the alloc
operation: the allocation of a block fails if there is no free cell left. Thus, the the-
orems such as store alloc that are dened in the rst implementation still hold
in this second implementation. When the allocation does not fail, it behaves as
the allocation of the innite memory. This is shown in gure 8. The theorem
alloc nite to innite results from the denition of both allocation operations.
The compilation of a program fails as soon as an allocation fails. As each step
of the compilation process allocates memory blocks, there are many opportunities
for the compiler to fail. In the memory that stores data, the evolution of block
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Abstract specification:
alloc : Tmem → Tofs → Tofs → option (Tmem ∗ Tblock)
Two implementations:
Denition alloc1 (m:Tmem) (lo hi : Tblock) :=
Some . . . (* never fails *)
Denition alloc2 (m:Tmem) (lo hi : Tblock) :=
if (* no free cell left *) then None
else alloc1 m lo hi.
Theorem alloc nite to innite:
∀ (m1 m2 : Tmem) (b lo hi : Tblock),
alloc2 m1 lo hi = Some (m2, b) ⇒ alloc1 m1 lo hi = Some (m2, b).
Fig. 8. Reuse of the allocation operation
allocation during the compilation process is the following. For each instance of
a called procedure:
 The dynamic semantics of C allocates a block for each declared variable.
 The translation from C to the rst intermediate language L1 of the com-
piler allocates a single block for all the local variables of the procedure that
are either of array type or whose addresses are taken. Thus the number of
allocated blocks decreases but the size of each block increases.
In the case of the translation from C to L1, the size of all allocated blocks in
the data area is the same in the semantics of C and L1. In other translations from
one intermediate language Li to another intermediate language Lj , the number
of allocated blocks increases slightly. The translation allocates indeed the blocks
that correspond to the blocks of Li but also other blocks that are built by the
translation of long expressions made up of several variables and function calls.
Concerning the memory area that stores code, each translation of the com-
pilation process computes information that need to be stored in memory. At the
end of the process, all the information have been computed and the target code
may be emitted. If for instance a translation from one intermediate language
Li to another intermediate language Lj occurs, the semantics of Li allocates
as many blocks as the dynamic semantics of Lj . However, the blocks allocated
by the dynamic semantics of Lj are becoming bigger. For instance, the return
address of a called procedure is only known (and stored) at the end of the com-
pilation process. As the translations do not preserve the contents of memory
blocks, they may fail because they translate blocks into bigger blocks. Thus:
 During the compilation process, any translation fails when it translates a
block into a bigger block.
 The execution of a translated program may fail, although the execution of
the program does not fail.
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With such a nite memory model, we prove the following correctness result
for each translation: if the translation of a program does not fail, if that program
terminates on some nal memory state, and if the translated program also ter-
minates, then it terminates on the same memory state. This property is weaker
than the property we prove for an innite memory model.
Instead of dening a more precise memory model, we intend to perform
a static analysis that will track the amount of allocated memory for a given
compilable program and compute an approximation of this amount if the control
ow graph of the program is acyclic. We will then have to prove an equivalence
result between the execution of the program and its execution in a stack discipline
language where only one block is allocated. This will require the denition of
such a language and the proof of semantic equivalence between this language
and the corresponding language of the compiler.
4 From Formal Specications to Code
This section gives an overview of the architecture of the Coq development. Fig-
ures 9 and 10 show the Coq modules that have been built in order to formally
verify the memory model. OCaml modules have been automatically generated
from them. The generated modules have the same architecture as the Coq mod-
ules. The Coq extraction mechanism removes the axioms and theorems, and
more generally the terms of type Prop.
The abstract specication consists of the three signature modules of g-
ure 9. They are declared with the keyword Module Type. The module called
MEM PARAMS collects the parameters of the memory model. These are Coq
variables of type Set that Coq uses to type abstract specications. They dene
the contents and the addressing of memory cells and are left abstract in the signa-
ture modules. The module called MEM LAYOUT species the memory layout.
It denes the functions and axioms that are detailed in gures 1 and 2. These
denitions refer to unspecied types (e.g. Tblock) that are declared in a module
called MemP of type MEM PARAMS. The module called MEM OPS species
the memory management operations. It denes the functions and axioms that
are detailed in gure 3.
The gure 10 shows the modules that implement the signature
modules. For instance, the module MEM PARAMS IMPL implements
the module MEM PARAMS (see gures 4 and 5). The module called
MAKE MEM LAYOUT is the functor that builds a module of type
MEM LAYOUT from a module of type MEM PARAMS. All axioms that
have been dened in the signature modules are proved in the implementation
modules (thus becoming theorems). For instance, gure 10 shows the proof
script of the theorem called valid not valid di. This is a very simple proof
script that consists of a few Coq tactics. In this example, the proof script
unfolds the denitions and prove by contradiction that b can not be equal to b'.
More generally, these tactics can be user dened and correspond to the steps
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Module Type MEM PARAMS.
Parameters Tchunk,Tofs,Tcell, Tvalue: Set.
. . .
End MEM PARAMS.
Module Type MEM LAYOUT.
Declare Module MemP : MEM PARAMS.
Record Tblockdata := {high: Tblock ; low : Tblock ; contents: Map (Tblock, Tcell)}.
. . .
Record Tmem := {memdata: Map (Tblock, Tblockdata); . . . }.
Denition valid data block (m:Tmem)(b:Tblock) := ∃ v, m.memdata(b) = Some v.
Axiom valid not valid di:
∀ m b b', valid data block m b ∧ ¬(valid data block m b' ) ⇒ b 6= b'.
End MEM LAYOUT.
Module Type MEM OPS.
Declare Module MemP : MEM PARAMS.
Declare Module MemL: MEM LAYOUT.
Parameter load: Tchunk → Tmem → Tblock → Tofs → option Tvalue.
. . .
Axiom loaded block is valid:
∀ chunk m b ofs v, load chunk m b ofs = Some v ⇒ valid data block m b.
. . .
End MEM OPS.
Fig. 9. Architecture of the specication (signature modules)
that would be used in a hand proof. They are reused to prove interactively the
theorems.
Our memory model consists of several thousands lines of Coq specications
and proofs. The compilable OCaml modules that have been automatically ex-
tracted from the Coq specications implement the operations that manage the
memory.
5 Related Work
Several low-level memory models (often called architecture-centric models) have
been dened. They are dedicated to hardware architectures and study the impact
of features such as write buers or caches, especially in multiprocessor systems.
For instance, [22] uses a term rewriting system to dene a memory model that
decomposes load and store operations into ner-grain operations. This model
formalises the notions of data replication and instruction reordering. It aims as
dening the legal behaviours of a distributed shared-memory system that relies
on execution trace of memory accesses. These memory models are lower-level
Formal Verication of a Memory Model for C -Like Imperative Languages 17
Module MAKE MEM LAYOUT (P : MEM PARAMS)
<: MEM LAYOUT with Module MemP := P.
. . .
Theorem valid not valid di:
∀ m b b', valid data block m b ∧ ¬(valid data block m b' ) ⇒ b 6= b'.
Proof. intros; red ; intros; subst b; contradiction. Qed.
End MAKE MEM LAYOUT.
Module MEM PARAMS IMPL <: MEM PARAMS.
Denition Tblock := Z .
Inductive Tchunk := Mint1signed | Mint1unsigned | . . .
. . .
End MEM PARAMS IMPL.
Module MEM LAYOUT IMPL <: MEM LAYOUT :=
MAKE MEM LAYOUT MEM PARAMS IMPL.
Module MEM OPS IMPL <: MEM OPS.
Module MemP := MEM PARAMS IMPL.
Module MemL := MEM LAYOUT IMPL.
Denition load (chunk : Tchunk) (m: Tmem) (b:Tblock) (ofs: Tofs) : option Tvalue
:= . . .
Theorem loaded block is valid: ∀ chunk m b ofs v,
load chunk m b ofs = Some v ⇒ valid data block m b.
Proof. . . . Qed.
Theorem load store same: ∀ chunk m1 m2 b1 ofs1 v,
store chunk m1 b1 ofs1 v = Some m2 ⇒
load chunk m2 b1 ofs1 = Some (load result chunk v).
Proof. . . . Qed.
End MEM OPS IMPL.
Fig. 10. Architecture of the specication (implementation modules)
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than ours (thus relying on a very dierent representation of memory) and are
not dedicated to C -like languages.
Other research has concentrated on the formalisation of properties of pro-
grams that manipulate recursive data structures dened by pointers. New logics
that capture common storage invariants have also been dened in order to fa-
cilitate and automate the proof of properties about pointers. These logics are
based on separation logic [5], an extension of Hoare logic where assertions may
refer to pointer expressions in a more concise and meaningful way. Two operators
facilitate the expression of memory properties in separation logic: a separative
conjunction allows one to express the separation of one piece of memory with
respect to another, a separating implication allows one to introduce hypotheses
about the memory layout. The denition of a renement calculus for the sep-
aration logic is currently investigated [16]. In the near future, separation logic
should be implemented, as is Hoare logic in tools dedicated to the B method.
Some ideas of separation logic have been formalised in Isabelle/HOL in order
to verify the correctness of Java programs with pointers [15]. [9] presents a
tool for formally proving that a C program is free of null pointer dereferencing
and out-of-bounds array access. Some of our properties of memory management
operations are also stated in [15] and [9].
Another way to prove properties about programs involving pointers is to de-
ne type systems that enable compilers to detect errors in programs. Some type
systems are dedicated to a specic part of a compiler (e.g. assembly code [8]).
Type systems for memory management have been applied for low-level mem-
ory management [24]. For instance, typed region systems where each memory
location has an intended type and an actual type, have been dened to verify
garbage collectors.
Much work has been done on verifying the complete correctness of a compiler.
[11] and [3] use renement as a compilation model. In the former, a renement
calculus is dened to support the compilation of programs written in an idealised
high-level language into the .NET assembler. The aim of this work is to rene
the whole compilation process and this approach is not automated by tools.
The latter uses a term rewriting system to reduce programs into normal forms
representing target programs.
The translation validation approach [18, 19, 10, 20, 21] aims at validating ev-
ery run of the compiler, producing a formal proof that the produced target code
is a correct implementation of the source code. This approach is based on pro-
gram checking and on static analysis. It has been applied a lot for validating a
variety of compiler optimizations, with a recent focus on loop transformations
[27]. In the proof carrying code approach [17, 2, 12], the compiler is rewritten
in a certifying compiler that produces both a compiled code and a proof term
of some properties (called safety rules) to verify, that have been added in the
source program. Safety rules are written in rst-order predicate logic extended
with predicates for type safety and low-level memory safety. Many specialised
type systems have been used in this approach tat has been extensively applied
to Java bytecode certication.
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Our work belongs to a project that investigates the feasibility of formally
verifying the correctness of a C -like compiler itself. The goal is to write the
compiler directly in the Coq specication language. Other projects that develop
machine-checked proofs of compiler correctness focus on data ow analyses and
other compiler transformations [6, 23]. They do not require a memory model as
precise as ours.
6 Conclusion
This paper has presented a formalisation and a verication in Coq of a memory
model for C -like languages. Thanks to the use of Coq modules, this formalisa-
tion has been specied at two levels of abstraction. Two concrete specications
have been implemented from an abstract specication. They describe an innite
memory and a nite memory. Both memory models have a similar behaviour ex-
cept in the case of failure of the allocation of memory blocks. A signicant part
of the specications and correctness proofs have been factored out through the
use of modules. The memory model has been implemented as part of an ongoing
certication of a moderately-optimising C compiler. This compiler relies on 7
dierent languages whose formal semantics refer to the memory model, and on
transformations that require extensive reasoning over the memory model. Many
properties have been proved and certied programs have been synthesised from
the formalisation.
A limitation of our compiler is that the correctness proofs of the transforma-
tions use simulation lemmas that apply only when every statement of the source
code is mapped to zero, one or several statements of the transformed code. This
is not sucient to prove the correctness of more sophisticated optimisations such
as code motion, lifting of loop-invariant computations or instruction scheduling,
where computations occur in a dierent order in the source and transformed
code. Because of this limitation, we envision to dene a notion of equivalence
between memory states and to perform these optimisations on a higher-level
intermediate language, whose big-step semantics make it easier to reorder com-
putations without worrying about intermediate computational states that are
not equivalent.
Another current focus is the formalisation of non-terminating programs. The
languages of our compiler are dened by big-step semantics that hide non-
termination of programs. Our correctness proof states that any source program
that terminates on some nal memory state is compiled into a program that
also terminates, produces the same memory state and calls the same functions
in the same contexts. Previous experiments in the writing of small-step seman-
tics showed us that they are not adapted for proving on machine properties such
as semantic equivalence between languages. We intend to dene semantics that
collect more information than big-step semantics but that are not as concrete as
small-step semantics.
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